Mistake of Law as to Validity of Ex Parte Divorce as a Defense to Bigamy by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 7
Fall 1949
Mistake of Law as to Validity of Ex Parte Divorce as
a Defense to Bigamy
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1949) "Mistake of Law as to Validity of Ex Parte Divorce as a Defense to Bigamy," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 25: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol25/iss1/7
DIVORCE
MISTAKE OF LAW AS TO VALIDITY OF EX PARTE DIVORCE AS A
DEFENSE TO BIGAMY
Long, a resident of Delaware, went to Arkansas to regain his health and
to procure a divorce. He secured a divorce in an ex parte proceeding and
immediately after the final award returned to Delaware where he shortly
married another woman. Before remarrying he consulted three times with a
lawyer as to the validity in Delaware of the Arkansas decree and was advised
that his remarriage would be legal. There was no evidence that this lawyer
was in the least incompetent or gave the matter insufficient consideration.
Long was indicted for bigamy and was convicted in the trial court. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized that the lower court had properly
questioned the jurisdiction of Arkansas to grant a valid divorce decree but
awarded a new trial on the basis that a mistake of law is a complete defense
where the accused has made a diligent effort, using the most appropriate
means available, to ascertain the law and has acted in reliance on that infor-
mation. The burden was placed on the accused to prove all such measures
taken. Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1949).
The patchwork development of our extra-territorial divorce law has
created an anomalous situation if a man can be convicted of bigamy though
he uses the most appropriate means which our legal system offers to ascertain
the validity of his decree in other states. It is easy to be mistaken as to
validity of a foreign divorce because of the uncertainty of recognition of the
decree.' The full faith and credit clause2 compels recognition of a foreign
judgment if it has been based on proper jurisdiction, which for divorce is
bona fide domicilY However, recognition required by the full faith and
credit clause has not always been the same. An early decision left open the
possibility of a bigamy conviction after a foreign ex parte decree.' This
possibility was later restricted to situations where the decree had been sought
in an ex parte proceeding outside the state of matrimonial domicil.5 Williams
1. See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226, 246-247 (1945). A jury in the old domiciliary state may find no domicil present on
proof close to that which the foreign court considered when it did find domicil present.
2. U. S. CoNrsT. Art. IV, § 1.
3. Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 (1856) ; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869)
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
4. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869). Here, although only one party
had domicil in the awarding state, the other party appeared.
5. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906). New York, the matrimonial domicil
where the wife still resided, was not required to give full faith and credit to a Connecticut
decree, since it was obtained by the husband who wrongfully left his wife in the matri-
monial domicil, service on her having been made by publication and she not appearing
in the action. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901) had directed full faith recogni-
tion where the ex parte decree was given by the state of matrimonial domicil and the
wife did not have a right, on the facts, to acquire a separate domicil.
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1,6 reversing the matrimonial domicil rule, forced the court to give full faith
and credit if the party who procured the divorce was domiciled in the awarding
state and the jurisdictional fact of domicil was not attacked. Williams I7
decided that the full faith and credit clause did not compel a state to recognize
the finding of a foreign court on domicil as final.' This decision leaves doubt
as to the validity of an ex parte decree outside the awarding state. If another
state finds that domicil was lacking, the decree, having been rendered without
jurisdiction, is void' and need not be recognized under full faith as a defense
to a charge of bigamy.
Sherrer v. Sherrer0 held that when both parties appear and could have
litigated domicil, they are bound by the decree. The old domiciliary state itself
may be bound, 1 but this is questionable since the old state was not itself a
party and its interests arguably could not be foreclosed. 2 If its interests are
not foreclosed, it may be able, by making its own finding on the question of
foreign domicil, to convict of bigamy persons who rely on a foreign divorce.
In view of Sherrer v. Sherrer, however, the greater danger of criminal con-
viction for recipients of foreign decrees appears to be to those who have
received them in ex parte proceedings, since many of the invalidations of
foreign divorces are made because one party was not there to protect his
own interests.
Mistake of law has not in the past been classified as a defense 3 to
bigamy. 4 An error as to recognition that will be given a foreign divorce
decree in other states is termed a mistake of law,' 5 therefore such an error
has been no defense. The bases of the general theory on which disallowance
6. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 289 (1942). Any state in which either of
the parties to a marriage is domiciled has the power to grant a divorce entitled to full
faith and credit. The jurisdictional fact of domicil was not attacked here.
7. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945). Bear in mind the decree
attacked was ex parte.
8. "Respect, and more" must be given the foreign decree. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 233 (1945).
9. But see Harper, The Myth of Void Divorce, 2 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 335,
339 (1935).
10. 334 U. S. 343 (1948). A companion case holding the same was Coe v. Coe,
334 U. S. 378 (1948).
11. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 354 (1948).
12. See Paulsen, Migratory Divorce: Chapters III and IV, 24 IND. L. J. 25, 39
(1948).
13. Mistake of law refers to an error as to the efficacy of a known foreign decree
while mistake of fact is an error going to the question of whether legal action has or has
not been brought. A minority of states recognize mistake of fact as a defense to bigamy.
Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874) ; State v. Sparacino, 164 La. 704, 114 So. 601 (1927);
Baker v. State, 86 Neb. 775, 126 N. W. 300 (1910).
14. No distinction is made here whether the charge be bigamy, adultery, or bigamous
cohabitation where the basic facts leading to the charge are those discussed.
15. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 238 (1945) ; State v. Armington,
25 Minn. 29 (1878) ; State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 AtI. 1 (1935) (Charge was adultery
though the situation was one in which it could have been bigamy).
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of mistake of law is predicated are (1) the judges are to interpret the law
and the interpretations of defendants should not be given greater weight than
that of the judges,16 (2) the maxim ignorantia legis neminem excusat is im-
plied in the value-judgments in penal law, which is to say the laws themselves
represent the moral convictions of the community 7 and, (3) allowance of
such a defense would stultify practical enforcement of the penal law since
almost every accused would raise the defense.' Although the above rule may
be sound and is continually followed, it is improper to apply it to bigamy in
certain instances when committed as a result of an invalid foreign divorce; in
these cases the recognition of this defense is in line with our general prin-
ciples"6 of criminal law.
20
Ordinarily, one of these principles is that criminal intent be present, yet
this is necessary for bigamy only in a few states.2 1 Since bigamy is a criminal
proceeding, intent should be required. 22 However, even where it is considered
an essential element, mistake of law has not been a defense. In typical divorces
two types of mistake of law can be involved. One is a mistake that no law
exists prohibiting plural marriage. Another is a mistake of divorce law-
making a wrong prediction as to whether a union has been dissolved by a
known court decree. In applying the rule, mistake of law is no defense, courts
have made no distinction as to which type of mistake was involved. That this
lack of distinction is unreasonable can be seen by a comparison to the property
crimes where definitions of intent include a correct knowledge of the related
law22 of ownership of the property.24  If for larceny the definition of intent
16. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 353 (1944).
17. Id. at 353-355.
18. See People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 176, 31 Pac. 45, 47 (1892); "Without it
[ignorantia legis neminem excusatl justice could not be administered." 1 BISHOP, CRIi-
NAL LAW 197 (9th ed. 1923) ; 1 STORY EQ. JUR. § 110 et seq. (1866).
19. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1947).
20. The problem of mistake of law, especially that relative to divorce, and that of
a statute void for vagueness are very similar. In each the individual may not be able to
determine what is the law as applicable to his situation. See 23 IND. L. J. 272 (1948)
on the constitutionality of a statute so vague as not to be reasonably understood.
21. Martin v. State, 100 Ark. 189, 139 S. W. 1122 (1911) ; People v. Spoor, 235 Il.
230, 85 N. E. 207 (1908) ; State v. Goonan, 89 N. H. 528, 3 A.2d 105 (1938) ; State v.
Lindsey, 26 N. M. 526, 194 Pac. 877 (1921). The preceeding represent the view most
often followed; Contra, see note 13 supra. . . . In the states where mistake of fact is
recognized, mens rea also must be essential for mistake negates the criminal intent.
From the Indiana bigamy statute, INn. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1942) § 10-4204,
it would appear no intent is required in Indiana. Consider, however, the effect of Squire
v. State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874), in which mistake of fact was held to be a good defense.
22. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 290-291, 371 (1947).
23. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 365-366 (1947); Perkins.
Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 35, 51 (1939).
24. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 365 (1947) ; Perkins, Ignor-
ance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. 35, 46 (1939).
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includes knowing the property not to be the taker's, 25 it seems highly proper
that the intent to commit bigamy should be defined to include knowledge that
the previous union is undissolved by divorce .2 By so defining intent to com-
mit bigamy, the application of the ignorantia legis rule is properly confined
to mistakes as to substantive criminal offenses,2 7 the only field in which there
are good grounds for use of such a categorical rule. Upon this rationale of
expanded definition of intent the Delaware Court could have built its opinion;
however, they chose to speak in terms of mistake of law. The court may have
been thinking in terms of the above reasoning since the exculpatory mistake
was of the divorce law rather than of the substantive criminal prohibition.3
To determine the relevance of the Long decision to the law on recognition
of foreign divorces it must first be determined what policy considerations lie
behind the invalidation of a foreign divorce, and second, the effect of these
policy considerations on the foreign divorce. Each state has certain interests.2
to protect in order to maintain stability of legal relations and good moral order
in the community. To effectuate this protection it occasionally finds it neces-
sary to discredit a foreign divorce when to hold it valid would adversely affect
the domiciliary's marital interest in support, alimony or property. Estin v.
Estinl ushered in the doctrine of divisible divorce3 by means of which a state
can protect its citizens' interests without completely nullifying a foreign de-
cree. For purposes of ending a prior New York alimony decree the Nevada
divorce was invalid, but for purposes of changing marital capacity it was
25. INn. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1942) § 10-3001, 10-3002; Robinson v. State, 113
Ind. 510, 16 N. E. 184 (1887) ; People v. Brown, 105 Cal. 69, 38 Pac. 519 (1894) ; cf. also
the definition of receiving stolen goods, INn. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1942) § 10-3017:
Watts v. People, 204 Ill. 233, 68 N. E. 563 (1903) ; 2 WHARTON, CRUMNAL LAW 1542
(12th ed. 1932).
26. Suppose a mistake of ownership were made because a foreign judgment deciding
title to a chattel (e.g., replevin action or declaratory judgment) was invalid because the
court of the foreign state lacked jurisdiction. This is analogous to mistake of validity of
a foreign divorce decree because of failure to recognize it for lack of jurisdiction.
27. Cf. HALL, GENERAL PRINcIPLEs OF CRIMINAL LAW 370 (1947), and footnotes there.
28. Another indication that the court was reasoning in terms of definition of intent
can be derived from the fact that the court considered briefly the intent required for
the property crimes.
29. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541-549 (1948) ; Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U. S. 226, 230 (1945).
30. 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
31. Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 549 (1948):
The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible--to give
effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to
make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It accommodates the in-
terests of both Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by re-
stricting each State to the matters of her dominant concern.
For a comprehensive article on the possibilities of this problem, see Paulsen, Migra-
tory Divorce: Chapters III and IV, 24 INn. L. J. 25, 46 (1948).
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valid. 32  The Long case is another application of this doctrine. In effect, the
Arkansas decree3" is valid (since obtained and relied on in good faith) for
purposes of defense to a subsequent bigamy charge though it can hardly be
said to reinstate marital capacity, because Long now knows that the state will
not recognize the decree as effective to change his marital status.3 4
Probably many persons who take advantage of more liberal divorce
policies of other states sincerely believe that foreign decrees are as valid as
any. Counsel cannot be sure whether other states can successfully attack the
foreign decree. Individuals who, after diligent inquiry, remarry in reliance
on a foreign divorce decree should not be penalized because a state gives less
recognition to it than is given by the awarding state. Applying the divisible
divorce doctrine, hardships from these criminal penalties can be avoided. The
rule of the Long case will probably not appreciably affect the migratory
divorce rate, because an exacting standard of due diligence must have been
met by the defendant before the foreign decree can be valid for the limited
purpose of a defense to bigamy. If followed, this rule will result in alleviat-
ing some of the hardships to individuals who otherwise would be victims of
the foreign divorce law muddle.
32. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Rice v. Rice, 335 U. S. 842 (1949), charged
that the court in the Rice case was extending the application of the divisible divorce doc-
trine. It appears, however, that the majority relied strictly on Williams v. North Caro-
lina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), and Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U. S. 279 (1945).
33. Although ex parte foreign divorces have been most considered here in the appli-
cation of the rule of the Long case, it must be remembered that if a state can make its
own finding on the question of existence of domicil in a foreign state and thereby be able
to convict for bigamy a person who was relying on a foreign divorce where both parties
appeared, the mistake allowed in the Long case should exculpate here also, because the
fact, in itself, that two appeared is not determinative of nens rea.
34. It is not certain whether Long's marital capacity was reinstated until the Dela-
ware Supreme Court decision or never reinstated at all. If the former is true, not only
may one incident of divorce be divided from another but also an incident may itself be
split (in point of time).
